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Abstract
In this paper we propose a new, quantitative-based approach for the detection and the prevention of intrusions. Our
model is able to probabilistically predict attacks before their completion by using a quantitative Markov model built
from a corpus of network traﬃc collected on a honeypot. Moreover, the proposed collaborative architecture honeypot-
intrusion detection system provides a fully autonomous system with self-learning capabilities. To validate our approach,
we built a software prototype and compared its performance with the well known Snort tool. The results clearly show
that our system outperforms Snort on multiple criteria including autonomy, accuracy, detection and prediction rates.
Keywords: IDS, Honeypots, attack scenarios, automatic generation of attack scenarios, Honeypot-IDS integration,
Markov models.
1. Introduction and RelatedWork
Nowadays, attacks against computer systems become more speciﬁc, powerful, intelligent and may cause
considerable damages. Unfortunately, most of these attacks are new and unknown by protection systems
and requires, often, complex and expensive intervention for the recovery and the maintenance after attacks.
Thus, in the literature, several techniques have been proposed to increase the power of prevention and
detection against malicious attacks. Most of these techniques need qualitative information about the system
in order to work properly. However, this information is, often, manually extracted by analyzing systems
log ﬁles. With the increase of the complexity of the systems, the size of the information to be analyzed
become huge, preventing, thus, any manual processing. Researches were then directed to data mining- based
approaches to automate the process of data analysis. In the case of intrusion detection systems, several works
have explored the classiﬁcation techniques in which a network traﬃc is classiﬁed as normal or malicious. To
build a decision model a large amount of audit data is ﬁrst analyzed using data mining techniques in order to
obtain the frequent activity patterns. These patterns are then used to guide the selection of system features
as well as the construction of additional temporal and statistical features for automated learning. Classiﬁers
based on these selected features are then inductively trained using the appropriate formatted audit data.
These classiﬁers can be used as intrusion detection models since they can classify (i.e., decide) whether
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an observed systems activity is legitimate or intrusive. In [1], Cohen proposes a system called RIPPER
where the network traﬃc is analyzed by applying patterns and association rules. Lee in [2] applied the
work of Cohen to build an intrusion detection system (IDS). Furthermore, many other works use diﬀerent
approaches to build classiﬁcation models for intrusion detection: genetic approach [3, 4], fuzzy logic [5, 6],
Neural Networks [7, 8], Immunological based techniques [9, 10] and Support Vector Machine approach
[11, 12]. Clustering models have also been used for intrusion detection [13, 14]. In these techniques,
malicious activity should cluster together, separating itself from non-malicious activity. Clustering models
provides some signiﬁcant advantages over the classiﬁcation models, in that they do not require usage of a
labeled data set for training. However, the drawback of these models is a low detection rate.
Unfortunately, none of these techniques solves completely the problem. For instance, several techniques
can only classify partially the traﬃc in order to simplify the task of the human analyzer to focus his anal-
ysis on suspicious traﬃc (Semi-automated learning). In addition, the numbers of false positives generated
by these techniques is, often, very high compared to conventional systems based on attack signatures, as
S NORT .
In this paper, we propose a new misuse IDS approach based on Markov Models of order (n-1). These
models were ﬁrst used to detect intrusion at the operating system level, by tracing the sequences of system
calls and comparing them to typical sequences observed during normal system usage [15, 16]. Unfortu-
nately, this technique was only used for host-based systems (HIDSs). Only few works have proposed the
use of Markov models to analyze Network traﬃc [17, 18]. In these works, authors have represented the
traﬃc of normal user activity by combining some packets ﬁelds as features. The main disadvantage of all
these works is that they based on an anomaly based IDSs which generate too many false positives compared
with misuse based IDSs. Moreover, the creation of user proﬁles database is a very diﬃcult task. To over-
come all these limitations, our approach is a misuse based approach which collaborates between an IDS
and a honeypot in order to automate the process of attack scenarios generation. The traﬃc captured from
the honeypot, considered as suspicious by deﬁnition, is used to build a quantitative model. This model is
able to probabilistically predict attacks before their completion by using a statistical n-gram analysis. We
have implemented a prototype software with two main modules: the HoneyLens module used to sniﬀ the
network, analyze and build attack scenarios from the incoming and outgoing traﬃc of the honeypot; and the
ProbS ys module, used to build probabilistic model based on the Marcov Model of order (n-1) and to act as
an intrusion detection and prevention system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general architecture of our
approach. Section 3 shows how honeypot traﬃc is collected, ﬁltered and structured. In section 4 we present
the intrusion detection/prevention mechanisms based on some probabilistic measures. In section 5, we
present the practical experimentation and discuss the results. Finally, the conclusion is provided in section
6.
2. General architecture of our approach
The proposed architecture is a combination of two technologies : an intrusion detection system (IDS )
and the honeypot. By this collaboration we obtain a completely autonomous prevention and detection
system. As shown in Figure 1, the proposed architecture consists of two primary modules: HoneyLens
and ProbS ys. HoneyLens identiﬁes systems attacks by sniﬃng the inbound and outbound traﬃc of the
honeypot. After that, captured data is saved in a training dataset. This training dataset and all their future
updates are exported in real time towards ProbS ys system. ProbS ys is an IDS/IPS installed between the
f irewall and the local network. Its role is to protect the local network by capturing and identifying, in real
time, systems intrusions before their completion. ProbS ys makes some probabilistic measures based on a
Markov model of the order(n-1) to probabilistically predict the next action of an attack. Parameters of the
Markov model are token from the training dataset.
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3. Generation of the training corpus
To optimize the informations access and retrieval operations on the training dataset (corpus), we have
adopted a tree representation of the data. Each branch in the tree represents a weighted attack scenario, and
each node represents an elementary action. Weights represent the frequencies (occurrence) of elementary
actions composing an attack scenario. Lets use an example of ﬁve diﬀerent scenarios (the alphabetical
letters of these scenarios represent elementary actions): S 1 : [aab], S 2 : [bcab], S 3 : [abbc], S 4 : [bcbb]
and S 5 : [aac]. The occurrence of these scenarios are 5, 3, 7, 4 and 3 for S 1, S 2, S 3, S 4, and S 5 respectively.
The ﬁgure 2 shows how they will be structured as a weighted tree.
3.1. Generation of attack scenarios
In our approach, an attack scenario is built as a sequence of elementary actions. An elementary action
represents an atomic message resulting from a request or a response of the execution of a communication
protocol (TCP, IP, etc.). However, atomic messages sent over the Internet could be fragmented into small
segments. Therefore, we have developed a module to rebuild an atomic message from a set of fragments.
To perform this task in both HoneyLens and ProbS ys, the module does the following steps :
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Fig. 2. The tree structure of attack scenarios.
1. Extracting and clustering - in real time - selected packets carried between two IP addresses (hosts) via
the same source and destination ports from the sniﬀed traﬃc.
2. Analyzing and ﬁltering traﬃc by eliminating unnecessary packets. For instance, ACK packets used to
insure the ﬂow control should not be considered as useful data.
3. Reassembling packets and fragments to rebuild the atomic messages from fragments.
4. Building elementary actions from atomic messages (packets) by considering only speciﬁc ﬁelds of a
message such as the destination port. Note that dynamic information within packets dont need to be
considered since we are interested to identify the type of the action. For instance, an attack using an
FTP vulnerability will always use the destination port 21, however, since the source port could have any
value, this information does not contribute to determine the type of the attack. Any elementary action is
identiﬁed by: a code (a unique id), a description, a protocol (among: ARP, RARP, IP, ICMP, TCP and
UDP), an actor (attacker or victim), port (destination port) and the signature derived which contains the
atomic message payload or a part of it.
3.2. Insertion of attacks scenarios in the training corpus
Once a scenario is identiﬁed, HoneyLens adds it in its database having tree structure. HoneyLens checks
if this scenario has already been encountered. In the positive case, only arc weights need to be modiﬁed,
otherwise, a new branch is created by incrementing the arc weights of the common sub-scenario and giving
the value 1 to the weights of the remaining arcs. To check the existence of a scenario in the database,
we compare elementary actions ﬁelds. To compare signatures (message payloads), we use a similarity
approach inspired from LCS Algorithm (Longest Common S ubstring) [19], primarily designed to compute
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similarities between strings which is a critical task in many applications, ranging from molecular biology to
data mining. We use the following formula to calculate the similarity between the payloads (signature) of
two elementary actions:
S im(Pld1, Pld2) =
∣∣∣LCS (Pld1, Pld2)∣∣∣
max
{∣∣∣Pld1∣∣∣, ∣∣∣Pld2∣∣∣}
where Pldi is the payload of the action i and LCS (Pld1, Pld2) is the LCS between Pld1 and Pld2.
4. Probabilistic measures and intrusion detection
By using the training dataset received from HoneyLens, ProbS ys computes probabilistic measures,
in order to predict and prevent threats and potential risks related to the current elementary action. The
probabilistic measures performed by ProbS ys are based on Markov models of the order(n-1), these models
were used for the ﬁrst time in [20] to predict characters in terms of others known characters. Currently,
this model is mostly used in the natural language processing (NLP) domain [21, 22]. These probabilistic
measures made by ProbS ys allows to predict what is the next elementary action during the current attack
scenario and permit to predict a sequence S of k components (k ≥ n) if we know the n − 1 previous
components. The current component (action) of this sequence depends only on its n−1 previous components,
thus the probability of the sequence S is given by the following formula :
P(S = c1, c2, ..., ck) =
k∏
i=1
P(ci|ci−n+1, ..., ci−1) = P(c1)P(c2|c1)P(c3|c1, c2)...P(ck |ck−n+1, ..., ck−1)
In the conditional probability P(ci|ci−n+1, ..., ci−1) we call ci−n+1, ..., ci−1 the history and ci the prediction.
We use a Markov model by considering an attack scenario S as a sequence of k elementary actions
A1, A2, ..., Ak (in our approach, n always equals k). The scenarios probability is given by:
P(S = A1, A2, ..., Ak) =
k∏
i=1
P(Ai|Ai−1, ..., A1) =
k∏
i=1
P(Ai|Ai−11 ) Here, Ai−11 = A1, ..., Ai−1
With :
P(Ai|Ai−11 ) =
f req(Ai−11 Ai)∑
Ax f req(A
i−1
1 Ax)
=
f req(Ai−11 Ai)
f req(Ai−11 )
f req(Ai−11 Ai) is the occurrences number of the sequence A
i−1
1 Ai in the training corpus. So,
P(Ai|Ai−1) = f req(Ai−1Ai)∑
Ax f req(Ai−1Ax)
=
f req(Ai−1Ai)
f req(Ai−1)
From all these formulas and from the conditional probability formula, we can deduct the following rule:
P(S |A1) = P(A1, ..., Ak |A1) = P(A1, ..., Ak, A1)P(A1) =
P(S )
P(A1)
=
∏k
i=1 P(Ai|Ai−11 )
P(A1)
=
P(A1)P(A2|A11)P(A3|A21)...P(Ak |Ak−11 )
P(A1)
=
P(A1)
∏k
i=2 P(Ai|Ai−11 )
P(A1)
=
k∏
i=2
P(Ai|Ai−11 )
Therefore, we can generalize this rule as follows :
P(A1, ..., Ak |A1, ..., Am)m<k = P(Ak1|Am1 )m<k =
k∏
i=m+1
P(Ai|Ai−11 )m<k
Consequently, our probabilistic system is able to calculate the following quantitative measures:
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• P(S i = A1, ..., An|A′1, ..., A′m) : The probability of scenario S i = A1, ..., An if we know the sequence
[A′1, ..., A
′
m].
• P(Ai|A′1, ..., A′m) : The probability of the action Ai if we know the sequence [A′1, ..., A′m].
The previous probabilities are computed as follows:
P(S i = A1, ..., Ak |A′1, ..., A′m)m<k =
P(A1, ..., Ak, A′1, ..., A
′
m)
P(A′1, ..., A′m)
=
{
0 if [A1, ..., Am]  [A′1, ..., A
′
m]∏k
i=m+1 P(Ai|Ai−11 )m<k else
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0 if [A1, ..., Am]  [A′1, ..., A
′
m]∏k
i=m+1(
f req(Ai−11 Ai)
f req(Ai−11 )
)m<k else
P(Ai|A′1, ..., A′m) =
f req(A
′m
1 Ai)∑
Ax f req(A
′m
1 Ax)
=
f req(A
′m
1 Ai)
f req(A′m1 )
For example, in the case of the scenarios tree (training corpus) of the Figure 2. Suppose that ProbS ys
captures the actions sequence [abb], then it process as summarized in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. Example of Probabilistic Annotations.
As shown in this table, our ProbS ys realizes two types of probabilistic measures : probabilistic measures
to determine if the current traﬃc is an attack scenario or no (probabilistic measures of the third row), and
probabilistic measures to predict the next elementary action of the current traﬃc (probabilistic measures of
the fourth row). To do so, ProbS ys calculates ﬁrstly the probability that the current traﬃc is one of the 5
scenarios of the training corpus, and when one of these probabilities is more than a threshold deﬁned by the
user (0.9 for example), it launches an alert. The second type of measures is just to provide more information
about the current traﬃc by predicting which will be its next elementary action.
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In this example, after receiving the action ”a”, ProbS ys determines that ”a” belongs to the scenario
S 3 with a probability of 0.47, to S 1 with a probability of 0.33 or to S 5 with a probability of 0.2. When
it receives the second elementary action ”b”, the system determines that the current scenario belongs to
scenario S 3 with probability 1 (it launches an alert), the same thing when it receives the third elementary
action ”b”.
5. Experimental study
5.1. Experimental environment
We implemented our systems by using C#.Net framework. The source code lengths of HoneyLens and
ProbS ys are respectively about 5000 lines and 12, 000 lines. We launched the two systems during two
weeks for validation testing. The architecture and environment of this experimentation are shown in Figure
4. As shown in this ﬁgure, we installed a Honeynet ROO system [23] consisting of two virtual honeypots
(Windows XP and Fedora 13) and a Honeywall bridge, most of the network services of these two honeypots
are enabled with the default conﬁguration. In addition to this honeynet we installed HoneyLens in the same
host machine. In another machine, we installed our intrusion detection system ProbS ys and S nort. Both
application are running in same level, so they can read traﬃc from the same Ethernet card.
S nort started with the last update of its detection rules provided by S nort Team. Whereas our system is
installed with an empty training dataset. HoneyLens, ProbS ys and S nort are launched at the same time.
5.2. The experimentation results
During two weeks of experimentation, ProbS ys treated more than 686,727 elementary actions. Their
distribution during that period is shown in Figure 5.
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Fig. 4. Network environment of our experience.
 
Fig. 5. The number of the elementary actions treated by day.
5.2.1. Evaluation of predictions results
To evaluate the eﬃciency of our system toward the prediction of attacks scenarios and the prediction of
the next elementary actions, we calculated the cumulative error rate of the predictions of the next elementary
actions. The graph shown in Figure 6 illustrates the result. The solid line represents the rate of the prediction
error concerning the most probable next elementary action, i.e.: the current captured action is diﬀerent from
the next elementary action that was predicted as likely the most probable action when capturing the previous
action. The broken line represents the error rate concerning all predictions given for the next elementary
action, i.e.: the current captured action is diﬀerent from all predicted actions given for the next elementary
action when capturing the previous action. We can see that at the beginning of the experimentation the error
rate was too high and the exactitude of the prediction is weak because we started with zero information. But
from a day to day, the system begins collecting more information and the error rate were drastically reduced.
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Fig. 6. Cumulative error rate of the prediction of the next elementary actions.
Despite the progressive declining of the error rate, it’s still relatively high (> 0.5) due to a high rate of
normal traﬃc captured by our ProbS ys against the suspicious traﬃc (the training corpus used to ensure the
prediction is collected from a honeypot system that comprise only suspicious traﬃc), so, to subside the error
rate below 0.5, the suspect traﬃc rate captured by ProbS ys must be greater than the normal traﬃc rate.
5.2.2. Intrusion detection results
During 2 weeks of our experimentation, ProbS ys launched 55 alerts Vs. 61 alerts for S nort. The
cumulative numbers of alerts generated by the two systems are given in Figure 7 and the daily detailed
unfolding alerts are given in Figure 8.
Fig. 7. Cumulative numbers of alerts generated by ProbSys
and Snort.
Fig. 8. Detailed unfolding of alerts generated by ProbSys and
Snort.
In the graphs of these two ﬁgures, we can see that:
• Our system started by generating a few alerts compared to those generated by S nort. This happened
because our system started with an empty training dataset. Few days latter, our system reached the
same number of alerts as S nort.
• Alerts generated by S nort and our system are almost congruent and this proves that our alerts are not
false positives.
• The rate of the false positives decreases over the time.
• Our system have detected attack that S nort missed (5th and 6th day in Figure 8). These attacks can
be a true or false attacks (positive false). But, because the same scenarios of these attacks are already
captured in the honeypot system, there is a high probability that they are a true attacks.
The result illustrated in the previous graphs shows clearly the eﬃciency of our system and its ability for
auto-learning. Unlike S nort which began with a rich database of rules having the most recent update, our
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system started with zero information and reached the same ability as S nort. This explain the low number of
alerts recorded by our system at the begin comparing to those recorded by S nort, because at that time our
system was in a learning stage. Nevertheless, over time, the knowledge base of our system grew and this
allowed it to detect most of the attacks detected by S nort. Moreover, our system has an important advantage
compared to S nort which is the self-learning and does not require any human intervention. Finally, since
our system can detect new attacks that S nort missed, this proves the accuracy of our solution compared to
existing techniques.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a quantitative hybrid that combines two technologies: Honeypots and IDS
to build a new intrusion detection and prevention system, which is autonomous, fully automatic and with the
ability of auto-learning. The quantitative model implemented as a Markov model is able to probabilistically
predict attacks before their completion. According to our experimental results, we have proved that our
approach is very promising to guarantee systems security in a fully automatic way without any human
intervention. As a future work, we plan to explore other data-mining techniques ton extract other types of
information from the network traﬃc in order to improve further the prevention capabilities of our system.
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